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ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS: REVIVING 
THE VOIR DIRE FOR CHILD WITNESSES 
Lucy S. McGought 
INTRODUCTION 
Cain was the first child witness, but the chronicler of Genesis 
did not preserve Cain's account of his family's struggle to adjust 
beyond Eden. Had Cain told his story, would he have been 
credible? We know that in early adolescence he lied to God to 
cover up the killing of his brother.l We don't know whether our 
skepticism of children's testimony stems from Cain's example, 
but for centuries we have been unsure of all children's accounts. 
Debate rages even today over whether children, particularly 
child victims of serious assaults, should testify in open court. 
The highly publicized California "McMartin preschool prosecution" 
gave rise to a wave of statutory and trial innovations aimed at 
insulating child witnesses from courtroom trauma.2 
Recent literature and jurisprudence that consider both novel 
and traditional evidentiary procedures, however, express little 
t Vinson & Elkins Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, College of Law. 
B.A. 1962, Agnes Scott College; J.D. 1966, Emory University; LL.M. 1971, Harvard 
University. lowe a very special debt of gratitude to Ben F. Johnson, the first Dean of 
Georgia State University, College of Law, for making my legal education possible and 
for later hiring me as a colleague at Emory Law School. Acknowledgement is also due 
the W.K. Kellogg Foundation for its support of my interest in interdisciplinary work 
during my fellowship years, to my former research assistants, Kimberly Wooten and 
Mark Hornsby, and to Professor James W. Bowers of the Louisiana State University 
faculty. 
1. Genesis 4:1-11 (King James). 
2. People v. Buckey, No. A·750900 (Cal. Crim. Dist. Ct., 1984). See, e.g., Hoffenberg 
& Skuthan, Protecting Children in the Courts, 59 FLA. B.J., Oct. 1985, at 14-20. See infra 
notes 93-97 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court has rejected one 
such innovation, the "one-way screen," because the screen denies a defendant's rights 
under the confrontation clause. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988) (two thirteen-year-old 
girls testified, with one-way screening device in place, against defendant accused of 
sexually molesting them). 
557 
1
McGough: Asking the Right Questions:  Reviving the Voir Dire for Child Wit
Published by Reading Room, 1989
HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 558 1988-1989
558 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VoI.5:557 
concern for the reliability of children's testimony.3 Furthermore, 
most reforms have focused exclusively upon innovations affecting 
only criminal prosecutions. If the reliability of child witnesses is 
a genuine concern, then rule reform should extend to both criminal 
and civil trials. This Article will ask the fundamental question: 
If children are to be both seen and heard in court, what safeguards, 
if any, are necessary to minimize the likelihood of their giving 
false testimony? 
Part I of this Article examines the traditional rules of evidence 
to expose our beliefs regarding the special reliability risks of 
children's testimony. Currently, in the United States, three 
different approaches concerning child witnesses vie for acceptance. 
These three approaches are the federal or "no inquiry" approach, 
the "oath understanding" rule, and the "full inquiry" rule.4 
The federal approach, embraced in the adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in 1979, eliminates preliminary inquiry into a 
child's truthfulness. Instead, the child, like every other witness, 
may give his testimony under oath subject to cross-examination 
and to a limited number of exclusionary objections. Competency 
issues are thus converted into credibility issues. In state courts, 
a majority of jurisdictions still preserve the voir dire process for 
child witnesses; they differ, however, on the appropriate subject 
3. All of the Coy opiniOns, including that of the Supreme Court, express the dilemma 
as a choice between protecting children and a defendant's right to a fair trial, specifically 
the right to confront his accusers. That reliability of an accuser's testimony is somehow 
served by eye·to-eye contact with the accused is only obliquely suggested by Justice 
Scalia in the Court's plurality opinion. He asserts, with no reference to empirical data 
and without acknowledgement that reliability is even ascertainable: "That face·to·face 
presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the 
same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by 
a malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs." Coy, 108 S. 
Ct. at 2802. Precisely what those costs are is not a truism. 
4. Some states still use the presumptions developed by English law, that is, that a 
child over a certain age, usually fourteen, is presumptively competent, but younger 
children must. be specially qualified through a threshold voir dire before being permitted 
to give testimony. This view does not, however, represent a truly different approach to 
the voir dire process. States retaining age-bound presumptions have simply redefined the 
category of "children." Such presumptions only allocate burdens of proof, serving as a 
crude sorting device to determine when special competency proofs are necessary; they 
do not offer guidance about what questions are relevant to competency. The use of such 
presumptions begs the more fundamental question of the proper scope of inquiry when 
a child is offered as a witness. Regardless of how the term "child" is defined, is any voir 
dire necessary to screen for reliability risks of a child witness and, if so, what risks are 
to be taken into account? Cj. D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPmO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE 
VICTIM Is A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 27-39 (National Institute of 
Justice, Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice, 1985). 
2
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matter and scope of such questioning. Some states focus 
exclusively upon whether the child can demonstrate an 
understanding of the obligation to tell the truth-the "oath 
understanding" rule. Others permit a more freewheeling probe 
into the child's moral and cognitive development-the "full 
inquiry" rule. None of these approaches examines the real 
reliability risks inherent in children's testimony. 
Part II explores the function of the voir dire process. Such a 
process is useful only if it tests for and can eliminate the most 
likely reliability risks. Current empirical data show that the three 
risks which pose the greatest potential for distortion in children's 
testimony are memory-fade, suggestibility, and imaginative 
recreation. This Article closes with suggestions to reform the 
current oath administration and voir dire processes by tailoring 
them to eliminate these three reliability risks. 
1. ApPROACHES TO THE QUALIFICATION OF CHILD WITNESSES 
Any witness' basic task is to give an accurate report of an 
accurate perception of some past event. Perceptual accuracy is 
meaningless unless the witness speaks truthfully. However, a 
commitment to tell the truth is meaningless unless the witness 
can form a perception of the observed event accurately. 
Historically, the law has used the oath ceremony and the voir 
dire, or preliminary examination, to test both the cognitive skills 
and the truthfulness of a proposed child witness. 
Classic jurisprudential analysis of witness capacity uses 
Wigmore's categories.5 The essential components are that the 
witness demonstrate a capacity for observation, for recollection 
and for communication. Communication capacity, in turn, is 
composed of two elements: an ability to understand and respond 
intelligently to questions, and a sense of "moral responsibility," 
defined as a "consciousness of the duty to speak the truth."6 
Accurate perception includes Wigmore's first two components of 
observation and recollection; accurate reporting includes both 
parts of Wigmore's third requirement-the ability to communicate 
and the felt obligation to communicate truthfully. 
The duty of accurate reporting, symbolized by the oath, is a 
directly enforceable obligation. Any witness knowingly giving 
5. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 506, at 712-13 (J. Chadbourn 
rev. ed. 1979). 
6. Id. 
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false testimony can be convicted of perjury. Accurate perception 
should be an equally serious concern but it is unenforceable by 
any direct sanctions against the witness. Instead, the concern for 
accurate perception is enforced only indirectly through rules 
aimed at preventing a witness' testimony altogether or discounting 
its effect. The initial concern of recorded law, a concern which 
still preoccupies courts today, is accuracy of reporting. Far less 
attention has been devoted to children's accuracy of perception. 
Over time and through different cultures, preliminary assurance 
of a witness' truthfulness has been sought. Some methods,7 like 
the rack and screw, were very compelling; but all methods, 
including the modern oath, serve notice that the truth is a societal 
expectation and command. The modern oath has been pared to 
a symbolic reminder of this expectation. 
A. The "Oath Understanding" Test 
Both common and civil law regarded child witnesses as suspect, 
only a short step removed from the perceived unreliability of 
imbeciles and lunatics. Reasons underlying this skepticism were 
not clearly differentiated. However, because of the spiritual 
immaturity of a child, his ability to appreciate an oath taken 
before God eclipsed all other possible concerns. Most children 
were precluded from testifying "because of their supposed inability 
to understand the significance of the oath" in a religious sense.8 
It is not altogether clear whether the early justification for 
finding children incompetent was the child's susceptibility to 
adult influence,9 the child's inability to distinguish truth from 
7. For an intriguing, though unannotated, array of truth·seeking rituals from differing 
cultures, see Note, The Oath as an Aid in Securing Trustworthy Testimony, 10 TEX. L. 
REV. 64 (1931-32). 
8. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE S 601[04], at 32 (1988). 
9. The taproot of testimonial disqualification is the law's early skepticism about 
witnesses' potential self·interest. Under Roman law, self·interest was broadly extended 
to include family members as well. Family interdependence, both affectional and economic, 
was thought to be a sufficiently strong incentive for perjury that parties' spouses and 
children were precluded from testifying; this same bond could be used to diminish the 
credibility of the testimony of domestic servants. LA. CIV. CODE of 1925 art. 2260, repealed 
by Acts of 1916, No. 157. English law, until the mid·nineteenth century, disqualified both 
plaintiffs and defendants from giving testimony in their own cause of acti(ln. 2 J. WIGMORE, 
supra note 5, S 602, at 736. The English law, however, never extended the self·interest 
disqualification beyond spouses. ld. at S 600, 731 n.3. Even though AngJo.American 
doctrine never used familial self·interest to disqualify children, lawmakers have long 
entertained grave doubts about children's ability to make autonomous testimonial choices 
adverse to the family's interest. Children's presupposed "suggestibility," which surfaces 
4
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fantasy, or a combination of these two presumptions. For whatever 
reason, until late in the eighteenth century, English courts did 
not permit children under the age of fourteen to give testimony.1o 
At that time, children aged fourteen and over became 
presumptively competent to take the oath and testify.u 
In 1778, when English law first permitted children to testify, 
the test for competency was oath understanding. Children could 
be heard provided that they "possess[ed] a sufficient knowledge 
of the nature and consequence of an oath .... [A]dmissibility 
depends up on the sense and reason they entertain of the danger 
and impiety of falsehood."12 Wigmore reported that "[i]t is not 
always possible to determine whether the language of the [English] 
Courts is used in view of the oath-test or of an independent 
testimonial requirement."13 However, Wigmore concluded that 
the English rule was focused primarily on the child's understanding 
of the oath.14 
often in legal commentary and decisions, seems to be an offshoot of this self-interest 
taproot. As but one example, the West Virginia Supreme Court confidently asserted in 
1893: "[Children] are as clay in the potter's hand, to be moulded, some to honor and some 
to dishonor. Lacking conscientiousness, they repeat with phonographic precision the things 
that have been told them to say, be they true or false." State v. Michael, 37 W. Va. 565, 
569, 16 S.E. 803, 804 (1893). 
10. Common law distinctions extended to several other classes of persons. See, e.g., 8 
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2181, at 6 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 
19611 (officers of justice, including judges, jurors, and attorneys are improper witnesses); 
2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, S 518, at 725 (insufficient religious belief necessary to take 
oath was ground for disqualification at common law!; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 
519-20, at 725-30 (any person convicted of treason or certain crimes requiring fraud 
or deceit were not considered competent witnesses at common law!; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra 
note 5, §S 576-77, at 810-19 (disqualification of any witness having an interest in the 
pending cause, including parties); 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 600-01, at 856-61 (a 
spouse of any party could not serve as witness at common law); 2 J. WIGMORE, supra 
note 5, S§ 492-500, at 697-709 (any witness who was insane, an idiot, or intoxicated 
was not competent to testify at common law). 
11. See B. JONES, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 20:10, at 605 (6th ed. 1972). Presumptive 
competence for individuals over the age of fourteen is thought to be a vestige of canonical 
influence in the early development of English law. Rowley, The Competency oj Witnesses, 
24 IOWA L. REV. 482, 488 (1939). 
12. The King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779) (announcing that there 
was no longer a per se rule forbidding the receipt of a child's testimony based exclusively 
upon the child's age). 
13. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 505, at 595. 
14. !d. The "oath understanding" rule developed at common law although England 
has now abrogated this test for competency. The modern English rule, now in effect for 
a half-century, permits a "child of tender years" to testify if, "in the opinion of the court, 
he is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence, and 
understands the duty of speaking the truth." Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 
& 24 Geo. 5, ch. 12, § 38. Within the classification scheme of this Article, England would 
now fall within the "full inquiry" rule category. 
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Several states still screen child witnesses by focusing exclusively 
on the child's ability to understand an oath.15 According to this 
rule, if a child demonstrates an understanding of the obligation 
to tell the truth, he is competent to relate his perceptions even 
if there are reasons to believe his perceptions are faulty. At 
times, the "oath understanding" voir dire addresses general 
cognitive capacity. Generally, however, issues of the perceptual 
accuracy of the child's recollection are reserved for cross-
examination. 
For example, in an Alabama murder prosecution, the state 
offered a five-year-old witness. After preliminary inquiry by the 
court, defense counsel renewed its motion to suppress because 
"[h]e has shown no knowledge of God, and that God awards for 
the truth and avenges for falsehood. He has no comprehension 
of the solemnity of the oath .... " At this point, the trial court 
resumed control of the voir dire: 
THE COURT: Okay. Dennis, do you know what it means to 
tell the truth? 
(NO ANSWER FROM THE WITNESS) 
THE COURT: Do you know what it means to swear to tell 
the truth and to take an oath? 
THE WITNESS: Db-huh. 
THE COURT: What do you do when you swear to tell the 
truth? 
THE WITNESS: When you tell the truth you have got to 
tell the truth. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else from the State? 
[STATE'S COUNSEL]: I don't have anything. 
THE COURT: All right, come down. 
(WITNESS LEAVES THE WITNESS STAND) 
THE COURT: Okay, I am going to overrule your Motion. I 
am going to allow him to testify.I6 
15. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. S 24-9-5 (1982): "Persons who do not have the use of reason, 
such as idiots, lunatics during lunacy, and children who do not understand the nature of 
an oath, shall be incompetent witnesses." 
16. Harville v. State, 386 So. 2d 776, 779 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980). In this portion of 
this voir dire, the court summarized a previous inquiry. The inquiry was a series of 
leading questions that never elicited any demonstration of an appreciation of consequences 
attached to falsehood. But see Cole v. State, 443 So. 2d 1386 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983). 
Although the appellate court dutifully cites the Alabama "oath understanding" statute, 
ALA. CODE S 12-21-165 (1975), it apparently applies a full inquiry rule: 
The courts of this state have not set a limit for children of tender age to 
testify. It is the duty of the trial court to examine a child of tender years, 
and in its discretion determine if the child has sufficient intelIigence to 
6
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Any preliminary inquiry by the court requires a specific purpose. 
A limited purpose of the oath-understanding voir dire is to ensure 
that the child understands his duty to report accurately or be 
punished for perjury. In contrast, a broader purpose of the oath-
understanding inquiry is to probe the child's propensity for truth-
telling. Because some jurisdictions authorize an examination for 
this broader purpose, it is important to consider the fruitfulness 
of such a procedure. 
Diogenes might never have found an "honest child" had he 
been equipped only with this type of voir dire procedure. The 
effectiveness of a search for honesty or truthfulness through 
propounded questions is easily discredited by our recorded 
experience. Jurisprudence shows many, often bizarre, accounts 
of judicial frustration caused by attempts to apply the oath-
understanding rule. 
For example, in Commonwealth v. Tatisos,17 the child appeared 
"bright and intelligent, and her answers are direct." In response 
to questions about the oath, however, she responded only that it 
was wrong to tell lies and if she did, a whipping would follow. 
Thereupon, the court adjourned the voir dire until the girl could 
take religious instruction so she could learn to appreciate the 
significance of the oath.ls 
Unlike Tatisos, no state court today would focus its inquiry on 
the theological basis of an oath,19 but courts have been given 
sUbstantial, even unbridled, discretion to question the witness' 
beliefs and moral principles. Some courts take a philological tack 
by inquiring literally into the meaning of the word "oath."20 
Critics have observed that "[e]ven mature and intelligent laymen 
observe, recollect, and narrate what occurs, and has sufficient mental capacity 
to be a witness. 
ld. at 1390. 
17. 238 Mass. 322, 130 N.E. 495 (1921). 
18. Commonwealth v. Tatisos, 238 Mass. at 323-24, 130 N.E. at 496-97. 
19. As of 1970, the religious conviction prerequisite has been statutorily abandoned 
in all states. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW S 1828 (J. Chadbourn 
rev. ed. 1976). For discussion of the religious conviction requirement, see Note, Witnesses-
Competency-Child Wlw Denied Belief in God Ruled Cwnpetent Witness, 38 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 95 (1962-1963); Comment, The Problem of the Child Witness-A Question of 
Competency, 32 CONN. L. REV. 103 (1958); and Comment, Youth a.s a Bar to Testimonial 
Competence, 8 ARK. L. REV. 100 (1953-1954). 
20. &e Zilinmon v. State, 234 Ga. 535, 537, 216 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1975) (affirming the 
exclusion of a seven-year-old defense witness because he did not demonstrate an under-
standing of the "meaning of an oath"). 
7
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might be somewhat put to it to give a definition that would 
strike the fancy of every court."21 
Even if there were consensus about the responses sought by 
a broad oath-understanding voir dire, social science research 
indicates that some children, particularly younger ones, are 
disadvantaged in comprehending the usual questions asked. The 
following series of model questions are suggested to attorneys 
who are faced with the task of qualifying a child witness under 
the oath understanding approach: 
Q. H you told these people a story, or something that wasn't 
true, what would happen to you? 
A. I'd be punished. 
Q. Who would punish you? 
A. God. 
Q. What would happen to you? 
A. I wouldn't go to heaven.:?::! 
Researchers have proposed a four-level scale of cognitive 
complexity in human communication.23 Level IV, the most 
sophisticated scale of discourse, requires a child to process his 
perceptual experiences through what are termed "simple 
conditionals;" for example, the child might be asked, "What would 
you do if you found a lost puppy?"24 Consequently, the very 
phrasing of the inquiry has substantial influence on a child's 
ability to respond. Hypotheticals, such as the model question 
21. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Obs&rVations on the Law of Evidew:e-The Competency 
of Witnesses, 37 YALE L.J. 1017, 1019 (1928). Among other data, this article collects a 
number of cases involving competency voir dires of children. 
22. Perry & Teply, Interviewing, Counseling, and In-Court Examination of Children: 
Practical Approaches for Attorneys, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1369, 1405 n.187 (1984-1985) 
(quoting 35 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d, QWJlifying Child Witness to Testify S 12, at 
683-84 (1983)). 
23. M. BLANK, S. ROSE, & L. BERLlN, THE LANGUAGE OF LEARNING: THE PRESCHOOL 
YEARS (1978); Blank & Franklin, Dialogue with Preschoolers: A Cognitively-Based System 
of Assessment, 1 ApPLIED PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 127 (1980). The four levels are: matching, 
selective analysis, reordering, and reasoning about experience. Id. at 130. The levels 
represent a scale of cognitive complexity ranging from the simplest, calling an object by 
its name (matching experience); through the slightly more complex behaviors of describing 
objects' characteristics (selective analysis) and forming patterns and sequences (reordering 
experience); to the most complex cognitive communication which is identifying causes 
and giving explanations (reasoning about experience). Id. at 135. Children develop along 
this scale as they mature. Id. at 128. 
24. Gordon, Adequacy of Responses Given by Low-Income and Middle-Income Kinder-
garten Children in Structured Adult-Child Conversations, 20 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 
881, 885 (1984). 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol5/iss2/3
HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 565 1988-1989
1989] THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 565 
above, require this Level IV capability. Such questions can 
befuddle a child who is truthful and predisposed to relate 
accurately. The purpose of the inquiry is thus defeated.25 
Even when the question can be understood, global abstractions 
are not likely to adduce meaningful responses. For example, 
consider another staple of oath-understanding voir dire: 
Q. Do you know the differences between right and wrong? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is the difference? 
A. When I do things right, I'm a good boy, and when I do 
things wrong, I'm a bad boy.26 
Social science research has documented little correlation 
between age and honesty.27 However, a substantial body of moral 
development theory explains why children at different 
developmental stages may be motivated to tell the truth. As a 
child grows older his reasons for telling the truth may change 
to include a perceived duty to society and to the criminal justice 
system.28 However, cognitive sophistication, not motivation, is 
required to discuss truth. "[A]sking a child to tell the meaning 
of 'truth,' 'oath,' or 'God' [or distinguish between right and wrong] 
probably tells more about his or her intellectual development 
than about the child's propensity to tell the truth."29 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 
601 argues that: 
No mental or moral qualifications for testifying as a witness 
are specified. Standards of mental capacity have proved elu-
sive in actual application . . .. Standards of moral qualifica-
tion in practice consist essentially of evaluating a person's 
25. See Perry & Teply, supra note 22, at 1371-74. They conclude: "Because of these 
advances in logical reasoning and memory encoding strategies, six to twelve-year-old 
children should be considered better witnesses than younger children. On the other hand, 
they are not yet equipped to handle either abstract, hypothetical dilemmas or situations 
that require an assessment of relative ethics." ld. at 1373. 
26. Perry & Tepley, supra note 22, at 683-84. 
27. See Goodman, Aman & Hirschman, Child Sexual Abuse and Physical Abuse: Chil-
dren's Testimony, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 16 (S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross 
ed. 1987). See also Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
73, 79 (1981). Melton wryly notes that there appears to be only a "rather modest" 
correlation between strongly asserted moral judgments and actual moral behavior. ld. at 
n.19. 
28. T. LICKONA, RAISING GOOD CHILDREN: HELPING YOUR CHILD THROUGH THE STAGES 
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1983). 
29. Melton, supra note 27, at 79. 
9
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truthfulness in terms of his own answers about it. Their 
principal utility is in affording an opportunity on voir dire 
examination to impress upon the witness his moral duty. This 
result may, however, be accomplished more directly, and 
without haggling in terms of legal standards, by the manner 
of administering the oath or affirmation under Rule 603.30 
Thus, the Committee justified discarding the oath-understanding 
voir dire in the federal system. 
Those states which have adopted the oath-understanding rule 
are motivated by a proper concern, but the voir dire is the wrong 
procedure to address this issue.31 Qualifying a child as a witness 
based solely upon his abstract appreciation of an oath's obligations 
is a test that is both overinclusive and underinclusive. It can 
exclude some linguistically unsophisticated but truly reliable 
younger witnesses, while failing to exclude the unreliable. In 
sum, the use of the oath-understanding voir dire to test a child's 
truthful predisposition appears to be an even less satisfactory 
measure with children than with adults. Such a process should 
be abandoned as confusing to many children and nearly always 
futile. 
B. The ((Full Inquiry" Test 
Under this approach, a broad inquiry into both the appreciation 
of the obligation to tell the truth and perceptual accuracy is 
authorized. Washington is one example of a jurisdiction that 
adhered to this rule.32 The Washington Supreme Court has found 
the following factors relevant to the assessment of children's 
competency: 
(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on 
the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the 
occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an 
accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an 
independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to 
30. FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee's note. 
3!' See infra S III. 
32. The Washington Code provided: "The following persons shall not be competent to 
testify . . . Children under ten years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just 
impressions of the facts, respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly." 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 5.60.050 (1963). In 1986, an amendment to this statute deleted 
the words "children under ten years of age." Thus, section 5.60.050 now classifies as 
incompetent only those intoxicated and "of unsound mind," as well as persons "incapable 
of receiving just impressions of the facts." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 5.60.050 (Supp. 1989). 
10
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express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the 
capacity to understand simple questions about it.33 
567 
In a jurisdiction which uses the factors listed above to assess 
competency, voir dire questions should cover a wide area yet 
indirectly produce important information on the subject of 
competency. For instance, a trial judge has provided a vivid 
illustration of how the competency voir dire should be conducted 
in a jurisdiction which has adopted the "full inquiry" rule: 
Q. What is your name? 
A. Katherine Anne Craig. 
Q. How are you feeling today, Katherine? 
A. Fine. 













Do you have any brothers and sisters? 
Do they live at home? 
By the way, how do you spell your name? 
How old are you, Katherine? 
When is your birthday? 
How did you get here today? 
Do you know what building you are in now? 
What town are you in now? 
Where do you live? 
What school do you go to? 
How far do you live from school?34 
The trial judge noted that competency assessing questions 
should be not only simple and easy to answer for the child, but 
should also help to relax the child through familiarity. Certain 
topics must be covered to form a basis for a competency 
determination and to enable the interrogator to pursue other 
important questions.a5 These questions include: 
1. General questions about the home and members of the 
family; 
2. Questions about his schooling, including his grade, present 
teachers, former teachers, subjects studied, class standing, 
grades received in former years, regularity of promotion, 
33. State v. Allen, 70 Wash. 2d 690, 692, 424 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1967) (child's age of six 
did not, as a matter of law, disqualify child as a witness). See also State v. Hunsaker, 39 
Wash. App. 489, 693 P.2d 724 (1984) (four-year-old child and two-and-a-half-year-old child 
not presumed incompetent based on age alone). 
34. Stafford, The Child as a Witness, 37 WASH. L. REV. 303, 315 (1962). 
35. ld. at 316. 
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failures, if any, favorite subjects, attendance record and ex-
tracurricular activities. If the child is of preschool age, or is 
very young, he should also be tested on his ability to count, 
read and spell simple words; 
3. Questions about his attendance at church or sunday school, 
including his frequency of attendance, names of his teachers, 
pastors and location of the church; 
4. Questions to demonstrate his knowledge of the difference 
between the truth and a falsehood, that it is wrong to lie and 
the consequences of telling a lie; and 
5. Lastly, the child should be asked some questions to dispel 
the possibility of coaching. A child that has been coached is 
suspect. In this regard, the following type of questions would 
be appropriate. 
Q. Have we met before, Katherine? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where? 
A. At your office. 
Q. When was that? 
A. Last Saturday. 
Q. Was anyone else in the room? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who? 
A. My dad and my sister Joan. 
Q. What did we talk about? 
A. About what I'd seen at the wreck. 
Q. Did I tell you about the wreck, or did you tell me? 
A. I told you. 
Q. Did I tell you what to say in court? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did I tell you to say? 
A. To tell everything I know. 
Q. Did I tell you anything else? 
A. You said to tell the truth.36 
A child witness should also be asked questions relevant to the 
subject on which she is testifying. Thus, for a child testifying 
about her observations of an automobile accident, the pivotal test 
should not be current intelligence, proper orientation in time and 
space, or memory of irrelevant everyday or academic learning 
36. Id. at 316-17. Although this voir dire addresses suggestibility, no facts about the 
number, nature, and scope of pretrial interviews are sought or elicited. Furthermore, the 
"Shirley Temple" responses reinforce our worst fears about coaching. 
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but the accuracy of a witness' perception and memory of the 
past observed event.37 
c. The uNo Inquiry" or Federal Approach 
In view of the weaknesses of both the oath-understanding and 
full-inquiry approaches, it is not surprising that critics have called 
for their abandonment. By far the most powerful critic was John 
Wigmore, then Dean at Northwestern University School of Law. 
In 1940, he wrote: 
A rational view of the peculiarities of child-nature, and of 
the daily course of justice in our courts, must lead to the 
conclusion that the effort to measure a priori the degrees of 
trustworthiness in children's statements, and to distinguish 
the point at which they cease to be totally incredible and 
acquire suddenly some degree of credibility, is futile and 
unprofitable . . . . Recognizing on the one hand the childish 
disposition to weave romances and to treat imagination for 
verity, and on the other the rooted ingenuousness of children 
and their tendency to speak straightforwardly what is in their 
minds, it must be concluded that the sensible way is to put 
the child upon the stand and let it tell its story for what it 
may seem to be worth.38 
Forty years later, the Wigmore position was incorporated into 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under the federal approach, no 
special precautions need be taken insofar as a child witness is 
concerned, either as to his appreciation of the duty to tell the 
truth or the accuracy of his present perceptions of the event 
that is to be remembered. Although every witness is administered 
an oath in the federal system,39 there is no separate requirement 
37. See Edmondson v. United States, 346 A.2d 515 (D.C. App. 1975). The defendant 
asserted that the failure of a seven·year-old witness to recall, during voir dire, the name 
of her kindergarten teacher who had taught her the previous year demonstrated her 
incompetency. Rejecting this argument, the court observed that the proper test was the 
"child's ability to recollect the events about which she was to testify." ld. at 516. 
38. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, S 509, at 600. Wigmore paraphrases Chief Judge 
Campbell in Hughes v. Detroit, G.H. & M.R.R., 65 Mich. 10, 31 N.W. 605 (1887). 
39. Rule 603 states: "Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that 
the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated 
to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do 
so." FED. R. EVID. 603. 
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that a child be questioned about the significance of the obligation 
to tell the truth.40 
The Federal Rules of Evidence also abolish all age-bound 
presumptions of incompetency.41 When a child is offered as a 
witness, opposing counsel has only the general grounds for 
challenge which would govern the testimony of any proffered 
witness. These objections include irrelevancy, such as lack of 
personal knowledge, or prejudicial or cumulative evidence.42 
As one federal circuit court correctly predicted in 1979: 
If these views [of the Advisory Committee which drafted 
the Federal Rules of Evidence] are to be rigorously adhered 
to, there seems no longer to be any occasion for judicially-
40. Rule 603 relies on the form of the oath or affirmation to reinforce the duty to tell 
the truth. The Advisory Committee rejected the view that a voir dire into oath·under-
standing and acceptance of its duty was authorized under this Rule. Apparently, appre-
ciation of the duty to tell the truth is foreclosed as a potential challenge. This stance 
may be viewed as acceptance of Wigmore's suggestion that U[t1he true purpose of the 
oath is not to exclude any competent witness, but merely to add a stimulus to truthfulness 
whenever such a stimulus is feasible." 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, S 1827, at 413. 
41. Rule 601 provides: 
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in 
these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an 
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of 
decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with 
State law. 
FED. R. EVID. 601. As Weinstein and Berger have commented: 
Since Rule 601 abolishes all grounds for disqualifying a witness (except when 
state law furnishes the rule of decision), a preliminary examination pursuant 
to Rule 104(a) for the purpose of determining competency is usually no longer 
required. This does not mean, however, that the trial judge no longer has 
any power to keep a witness from testifying. It merely means that the judge 
must focus on the proferred testimony rather than the proposed witness; 
instead of ruling on the basis of competency the judge must recast the 
problem in terms of relevancy. 
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 8, S 601[04~ at 26. 
42. Rule 401 states: '''Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 
401. Although relevant, some evidence may be excluded on preliminary examination under 
Rule 403 if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. 
As Weinstein and Berger, however, have noted: 
If there is doubt about the existence of unfair prejudice, confusion of issue, 
misleading, undue delay, or waste of time, it is generally better practice to 
admit the evidence taking necessary precautions by way of contemporaneous 
instructions to the jury followed by additional admonition in the charge. 
1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENCE S 403[011, at 10 (1988). 
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ordered psychiatric examinations or competency hearings of 
witnesses-none, at least, on the theory that a preliminary 
determination of competency must be made by the district 
court.43 
571 
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1979, the trial court's 
refusal of a preliminary hearing has been affirmed in all cases in 
which the competency of an adult witness was challenged j 44 the 
sole case in which a hearing was held and a challenged witness 
was found incompetent was reversed on appea1.45 Thus, questions 
about the past or current accuracy of a child witness' perceptions 
are credibility issues to be tested by cross-examination and 
weighed by the trier of fact. This federal approach to child 
competency has now been adopted in fourteen states.46 
Under the no-inquiry approach of the Federal Rules, the voir 
dire mechanism is now like an appendix, an atrophied vestigial 
organ of problematic function. Perhaps the reliability risks of 
adult witnesses justify this no-inquiry approach because data on 
adults' unreliability may not be as compelling as the data regarding 
children.47 We are still willing to presuppose that an adult's 
43. United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181, 186 (5th Cir. 1979). However, the court notes 
that a defendant might urge that a psychiatric examination is necessary to challenge the 
credibility of the witness. Id. at n.9. 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Gutman, 725 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1984) (trial court refused 
to require psychiatric examination of government witness who had experienced incident 
of mental illness year before trian; United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 384 (5th Cir. 
1981) (trial court granted request for psychiatric examination regarding a witness' current 
competency, but refused examination into mental condition at the time of the alleged 
offenses); Shank v. Naes, 102 F.R.D. 14 (D. Kan. 1983) (trial court did not bar depositions 
and interrogatories in motion for summary judgment despite deponent's mental incom-
petency). 
45. United States v. Villalta, 662 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981) (accuracy of an 
informant·witness' ability to speak Spanish challenged because his testimony concerned 
negotiations conducted entirely in Spanish). 
46. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 8, S 601[06]. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
906.01 (West 1975). According to the Wisconsin revision committee's notes, the adoption 
of the federal approach 
remove[s] from judicial determination the question of competency and ad-
missibility; judicial determination of sufficiency and the jury assessment of 
the weight and credibility survive. The effect of the change is the shift to 
opponent's emphasis from a voir dire attack on competency to a cross-
examination and introduction of refuting evidence as to weight and credibil-
ity. 
[d. (Judicial Council Committee's Note). See State v. Olson, 113 Wis. 2d 249, 253, 335 
N.W.2d 433, 436 (1983). 
47. See Johnson & Foley, Differentiating Fact From Fantasy: The Reliability oj Chil-
dren's Ml?mory, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 33 (1984) (common assumption that children's reliability 
is less than that of adult's). 
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memory stabilizes rather closely in time to any occurrence and 
that she can usually reproduce an account of her experiences 
with comparable accuracy at tria1.48 Any special deficit of a 
particular adult witness can be exposed by a face-to-face 
confrontation with, and cross-examination by, the adverse party. 
This seems to be an efficient judicial process because we are 
comfortable making the critical assumption that testimony from 
most adults is not flawed by substantial reliability risks. 
In contrast, modern evidentiary machinery is grossly inefficient 
if the time of the courts is wasted hearing children's testimony 
entitled to little or no probative weight. The occasional inefficiency 
of the unreliable adult witness may be tolerable49 but unreliable 
child witnesses are a much more predictable phenomenon.50 The 
Federal Rules fail to take this more frequent unreliability into 
account. 
The federal warts-and-all approach to witness credibility makes 
critical assumptions about our legal process. First, it assumes 
that the adversarial system produces equal prowess so that cross-
examination will be conducted effectively. Second, it assumes 
that cross-examination is capable of exposing the reliability risks 
48. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1159 (2d Cir. 1979). Watson is 
an example of the rare case in which such assumptions are explicitly expressed. Dissenting 
from the panel opinion, Judge Friendly cites the work of Ebbinghaus, which states that 
"memory declin[es] along an asymptotic curve, with most loss occurring within a few 
days and almost no further decline in the time span here at issue [the five-year statute 
of limitations]." Id. at 1159 n.l. (Friendly. J., dissenting). Judge Oakes challenged the 
continuing validity of the Ebbinghaus curve, insofar as adult memory is concerned: "In 
general ... 'psychologists no longer think in terms of the curve of forgetting. Forgetting 
is a function of many factors and there are many curves of forgetting.' " United States 
v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041, 1052 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Oakes, J., dissenting). 
49. See, e.g., United States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1983). During the testimony 
of an informant called as a prosecution witness in a drug distribution conspiracy trial, 
defense counsel moved for a physical examination to determine whether the witness was 
currently under the influence of drugs. The trial court demurred, simply asking the 
witness whether he took drugs as a practice or had consumed any medication on this 
particular day. On the second day, when the witness "had difficulty speaking," the court 
inquired further and secured his consent to an examination. The examining physician 
later testified that the witness had been under the influence of phencyclidine when 
testifying which caused him to be in "an acute confusional state." The court ordered the 
doctor's testimony and conclusions read to the jury and instructed them that the second 
day's testimony was stricken and not to be considered. Id. at 683. 
50. See, e.g., Chance & Goldstein, Face-Recognition Memory: Implications for Children's 
Eyewitness Testimony, 40 J. Soc. IsSUES 69 (1984); Marin, Holmes, Guth & Kovac, The 
Potential of Children as Eyewitnesses, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 295 (1979) [hereinafter 
Children as Eyewitnesses]. 
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of any witness' testimony. In the case of child witnesses, both 
assumptions further rest upon a shaky assumption that lawyers 
are fully aware of the reliability risks inherent in children's 
testimony.51 
Third, the federal approach perhaps assumes that there are 
strong professional restraints causing an attorney to reject some 
potential witI\esses in advance based upon the attorney's 
assessment of their likely unreliability.52 Cynics might observe 
that counsel is checked only when she perceives her child witness 
is unreliable and when that unreliability is likely to be 
demonstrated by a knowledgeable opponent. In any case, the 
federal approach presumes no efficiency gain from fashioning 
legal incentives to screen potential witnesses more carefully. 
Finally, the free-for-all no-inquiry rule gives very little guidance 
to attorneys deciding whether to produce a child witness. More 
importantly, the adoption of such a laissez-faire position means 
that we must forego the opportunity to be more efficient in the 
future. Echoing Wigmore, we can only continue to hear testimony 
"for what it's worth." Established rules of evidence can cause 
counsel to take pretrial precautions to ensure the probative value 
of any witness. However, unless the inducements are sufficiently 
high - an easier method of admissibility - or the costs are 
51. In fact, extant studies of lawyers' awareness of social science data, including the 
potential reliability risks in children's testimony, demonstrate that lawyers are only 
slightly more knowledgeable than the average juror. See Note, UnrelWhle Eyewitness 
El'idence: The Expert Psyclwlogist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. REV. 721, 
736-37 (1985). 
52. See, e.g., In re Schapiro, 144 A. D. I, 9, 128 N.Y.S. 852, 858 (1911) ("attorney is an 
officer of the court upon whom rests the responsibility of preventing false or perjured 
testimony and calling only those witnesses whom he believes to be truthful witnesses"). 
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct proscribe the knowing use of false or 
perjured testimony. "A lawyer shall not knowingly ... offer evidence that the lawyer 
knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its 
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures." MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983). Similarly, "[a) lawyer shall not ... falsify evidence, 
counselor assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is 
prohibited by law." Id. at Rule 3.4(b). 
An attorney is given discretion when confronted by potential testimony which he 
reasonably believes might be false but does not actually know is false. In this more often 
occurring situation, the Comments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct offer only 
equivocal guidance: "Generally speaking, a lawyer has authority to refuse to offer 
testimony or other proof that the lawyer believes is untrustworthy. Offering such proof 
may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence 
and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate." Id. at Rule 3.3 comment 14. 
Informal restraints, such as fears of drawing a reprimand or irritating the court, might 
dissuade an attorney from offering testimony of doubtful probative value. 
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sufficiently high-inadmissibility-the probative quality of 
testimonial evidence is unlikely to improve. 
II. THE ApPROPRIATE USE OF THE VOIR DIRE 
A. The Rules of Evidence as an Index of Skepticism 
If the purpose of a trial is to discover the truth about some 
disputed event or transaction, then the function of evidentiary 
rules must be to sort unreliable from reliable evidence.53 At the 
risk of oversimplification, the rules of evidence are based on the 
degree of skepticism evoked by particular types of proof. 
Collectively, the rules operate to distinguish when evidence is 
absolutely barred from consideration, when a threshold showing 
of probative worth is required as a precondition for admissibility, 
and when evidence is freely admitted. 
The rules distinguish between testimonial evidence and 
documentary or physical evidence. For certain non testimonial 
evidence, the American system still requires demonstrations of 
reliability such as foundational proofs of authenticity and accuracy. 
As a result of Wigmore's still palpable influence, the clear trend 
of the last century, however, has been to lower the barriers to 
admission of testimonial evidence. 
To illustrate this difference, compare the evidentiary rules' 
treatment of a photograph with that given to eyewitness 
testimony. A photograph becomes probative only upon proof that 
it is accurate and truly represents what it purports to show. The 
rules reflect skepticism about the accuracy of the camera's 
resulting picture.54 Thus, threshold certification requires that the 
photograph is an accurate portrayal by a witness who has 
personally observed the scene or expert verification that the 
process that produced the picture was reliable. The court must 
be provided testimony that the machine was in good working 
53. Of course, many of our evidentiary rules are premised upon the need to insulate 
lay juries from unreliable, and hence prejudicial, forms of evidence. We are willing to 
presuppose that seasoned judges are more immune to the prejudicial effects of unreliable 
evidence when making their fact findings in bench trials. Required prevenient proofs can 
insulate both a jury and judge from unreliable evidence. 
54. Although photography is now a well-established process whose ordinary reliability 
is commonly accepted, when the technology was new, elaborate prevenient proofs were 
required. See, e.g., United States v. Hobbs, 403 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1968) (requiring 
comparison between film negative and resulting print and proof that retouching by 
manual or chemical means had not occurred). 
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order and that nothing intervened during the film's development 
to distort the image.55 
If a witness verbally depicted the same scene, the rules do not 
seek similar assurances of reliability before receiving the account 
of his memory picture. Some testimonial reliability risks-specific 
misperceptions like "seeing" a light blue car viewed at twilight 
as beige-may not become apparent until the account is probed 
by cross-examination or until it is contradicted by other witnesses. 
These credibility risks are weighed most efficiently by the trier 
of fact because the risks usually are not apparent in advance of 
receiving the witness' testimony. More importantly, minor 
testimonial discrepancies do not necessarily skew the reliability 
of other aspects of the witness' account. 
Other reliability risks involving complex judgments beyond the 
capability of the average layman-such as asking a farmer the 
speed of the jet immediately before it crashed into his pasture-
can distort the truth of the testimony. This type of reliability 
risk suggests the need for a special showing of expertise through 
a truncated voir dire. Unless the necessary expertise is 
demonstrated, the court will preclude this line of inquiry.56 
Hearsay rules also utilize a mini-voir dire procedure. 
Collectively, the hearsay rule, with all its grafted exceptions, 
discriminates among types of out-of-court declarations. Unless 
there is a threshold showing of exceptionality, we are content to 
exclude such testimony because experience of centuries has 
demonstrated substantial reliability risks in reporting out-of-court 
statements. Each exception represents an a priori judgment that 
a specific type of statement was made under circumstances that 
overcome the general skepticism and insure the statement's 
reliability.57 
Still other reliability risks, such as memory-fade and memory 
distortion, can infect a witness' entire account. This most serious 
type of reliability risk suggests th4at a threshold inquiry should 
be conducted and, if it confirms the presence of wholesale 
distortion, the court should exclude the testimony. We use the 
shorthand term "incompetency" to refer to this last constellation 
of factors which can produce wholly unreliable testimony. 
55. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1), (9) and FED. R. EVID. 1001. For a discussion of these two 
bases for admissibility, see 3 C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 214 (3d ed. 1984). 
56. See FED. R. EVID. 701, 702; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 55, at § 13. 
57. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 803, 804. 
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B. The Function of the Voir Dire Process 
Wigmore's competency inquiry 58 suggests a camera metaphor; 
courts should treat human memories like photographs. Was the 
camera capable of taking pictures - accuracy of sensory 
perception? Was the photograph accurately processed-
recollection? Is the resulting picture an accurate representation 
of the observed scene-truthful communication? The problem 
with this broad formulation, which persists today in jurisdictions 
using competency examinations of children, is that it invites an 
abstract evaluation of a witness' cognitive abilities without 
providing guidance on how to assess the exceedingly complex 
matters of human perception, recollection, and communication. 
More troubling, as Wigmore's formulation goes, is the lack of 
emphasis upon the most critical component, accurate recollection. 
Few witnesses, including children, lack sensory perception and 
the ability to communicate. Most witnesses, especially children, 
experience memory-fade and potential memory distortion. 
Despite the availability of the voir dire, the procedure is not 
used to disqualify the entire testimony of a child witness by 
states that follow the federal approach. Perhaps the most powerful 
reason for not using testimonial voir dire, as it is currently 
practiced, is because it does not focus on the real reliability risks 
of children's testimony. Given our historic experience with such 
a voir dire simulacrum, the federal approach might appear 
preferable. Unless a preliminary showing is able to test for and 
to eliminate a specific reliability risk, it is probably more efficient 
to hear proffered testimony, consider the holes created by even 
a bumbling cross-examination, and decide whether all, most, or 
some facts are credible. 
The voir dire mechanism will be an efficient sorting procedure 
only if two requirements are met: first, we must be able to 
identify with some precision those reliability risks in testimony 
which ought to prevent admissibility of a witness' account; and 
second, we must be able to design a brief interrogation which 
will test for and eliminate specific reliability risks. 
C. Reliability Risks in Children's Testimony 
A considerable body of knowledge about the development of 
human cognitive processes has developed during the past decade. 
58. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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Children's capacity for observation and memory, skills critical to 
competent testimony, has enjoyed a renaissance of social science 
interest. 59 Overtime, seven reliability risks potentially inherent 
in children's eyewitness accounts have been touted.60 These are: 
lack of sensory capability; lack of attentiveness; perceptual deficits; 
inability to perform complex cognitive tasks; propensity toward 
fantasy, sometimes even a complete inability to differentiate real 
and imagined events; memory-fade; and susceptibility to 
suggestions, particularly those made by authority figures.61 
The first three risk factors, sense capacity, attentiveness, and 
perception, all fall within Wigmore's capacity for observation 
requirement. The empirical data of the last sixty years discount 
any special, child-related risks insofar as sensory capability or 
attentiveness is concerned.62 The five senses of sight, smell, touch, 
hearing, and taste appear to be keenest in early childhood. 
Similarly, developmental studies confirm that children are 
attentive observers of their world. In fact, young children appear 
to "encode" or make a more detailed initial mental record than 
do adults. With age comes a tendency to attend only to the "core 
details" of action. Adults ignore apparently irrelevant, peripheral 
information.63 Because reality does not so neatly sort into relevant 
59. The renewed interest in the memory capabilities of children was apparently 
sparked by a symposium sponsored fifteen years ago by the Society for Research in 
Child Development. For a retrospective summary of research from then until now, see 
ORNSTEIN, Introduction: The Study of Children's Memory, in MEMORY DEVELOPMENT IN 
CHILDREN 1-15 (P. Ornstein ed. 1978). 
60. See generally 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 1 (G. Goodman ed. 1984). Existing social science 
data is only briefly described in this Article. A more comprehensive analysis of the 
reliability problems inherent in children's testimony is set out in McGough, For WJw,t It 
May Be Worth: Enhancing the Probative Value of Children's Testinumy (1987) (available 
through author). See also McGough & Hornsby, Reflections Upon Louisiana's Child Witness 
ITideotaping Statute: Utility and Constitutionality in the Wake of Stincer, 47 LA. L. REV. 
1255, 1258-61 (1987). 
61. Psychic trauma has also been suggested by many experts as a potential memory 
distorting factor. Discussion of this reliability risk has been omitted because no syste-
matically conducted empirical studies exist. There is, however, a substantial body of 
anecdotal and impressionistic literature. See Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the 
Child l'ictim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 125 (1984); Brown & Kulik, Flashbulb 
Memories, 5 COGNITION 73 (1977); Pynoos & Eth, Develop-mental Perspective on Psychic 
Tralwza in Childhood, in TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE 36 (C. Figley ed. 1984). If the child 
witness has been the victim of some violence, this research indicates that the voir dire 
should explore the possibility of traumatic distortion of the account and expert testimony 
of evaluation should be freely received. See Terr, The Child As a Witness, in CHILD 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 207, 220 (D. Schetky & E. Benedek ed. 1980). 
62. See Johnson & Foley, supra note 47 at 33-34. 
63. See Neisser, The Control of Infornw.tion Pickup in Selective Looking, in PERCEPTION 
AND ITS DEVELOPMENT: A TRmUTE TO ELEANOR J. GmsoN 201 (A. Pick ed. 19791; Johnson 
& Foley, supra note 47, at 36. 
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and irrelevant detail, a child may be the only witness capable of 
providing a fact critical to resolving a legal dispute. 
The third risk concern, perceptual acuity, is more complicated. 
Any account of an observation is dependent upon the mental 
ability to label the items or events observed and to sort sensory 
intake into categories similar to those used by others making 
the same observations. The older, more worldly wise person 
possesses a larger, more sophisticated mental sorting mechanism 
than a toddler. Yet, on sorting tasks, such as color, elemental 
identifying characteristics, and basic object categorization, even 
four-year-olds appear to be reliable in their use of descriptive 
data which they do in fact recall.64 
The fourth reliability risk, children's inability to undertake 
cognitively complex tasks such as estimating speed or distance, 
is demonstrably real. Beginning with Piaget's research,65 young 
children have been shown to be unreliable when asked to make 
judgments involving relativity or comparison. Furthermore, recent 
data suggest that mastery of time and space assessments occurs 
significantly later than at ages seven or eight as Piaget 
postulated.66 Most trial court judges are intuitively aware of this 
cognitive limitation and would suppress any attempt to elicit such 
testimony from a child. Thus, this reliability risk does not pose 
any practical difficulty for the legal system and does not imperil 
the validity of children's descriptive testimony. 
The empirical data on these four factors suggests that if 
counsel, judge, and jury were summoned to the side of a six-
year-old immediately following an event and then questioned her 
about what she had seen, heard, or smelled in categorical language 
she could understand, they should attribute great weight to her 
account. Indeed, they should prefer her account to that of a 
similarly situated adult unless the dispute involves anchovies or 
camshafts or other phenomena presumably beyond her ken. 
Unfortunately, there is usually no early examination of a child 
witness, and disputes that ripen into lawsuits rarely come to trial 
quickly. These facts of life force us to confront the most serious 
reliability risks-memory-fade, fantasizing, and suggestibility. 
64. Perlmutter & Ricks, RecaU in Preschool Children, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD 
PSYCHOLOGY 423, 432-35 (1979). 
65. See J. PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF TIME (1927); J. PIAGET, THE CHILD'S 
CONCEPTION OF MOVEMENT AND SPEED (1946). 
66. Siegler & Richards, DeveWpment oj Time, Speed, and Distance Concepts, 15 DEV. 
PSYCHOLOGY 288 (1979). 
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Indeed, all other potential risks of unreliability pale in comparison 
to memory-fade. 
Human memory has three distinct stages, acquisition-the 
intake of data about an observed event, retention - the period of 
time during which the perceived data are stored in the mind, 
and retrieval-the process by which the stored data is recalled 
by the observer.67 A weakness during any of these stages 
diminishes memory. 
Individuals suffer memory loss and, upon reflection, can usually 
identify a cause. "Acquisition stage" failure occurs when the 
individual was not paying attention to what was said or done, or 
was watching some new or unfamiliar activity.68 "Retention stage" 
failure occurs when the event took place long ago and was no 
longer fresh so details had slipped away. Even if the events 
themselves were memorable, the circumstances surrounding the 
questioning may have been misunderstood or occurred during a 
time of distraction or tension, resulting in "retrieval stage" 
failures. We acknowledge that adult memory occasionally can fail 
because of these variables; there is now a significant body of 
research indicating that children's memory is weaker and more 
fragile than adults' at each of these stages.69 
The greatest difference between adult and child memory occurs 
in retention. Scientists agree that children are able to recall less 
information than adults when a significant period of time has 
passed before they are asked to relate the event.70 However, the 
finding that children's "long-term" memory is weak is especially 
striking because "long-term" memory, to a social scientist, is 
likely to mean only a few weeks or even a day.71 It seems plausible 
67. Loftus & Davies, Distortions in the Memory of Children, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 52, 54 
(1984). 
68. Some research indicates that the more familiar a child is with certain events, the 
greater the retention of specific details. See Chi, Knowledge Structures and Memory 
Deo'elopment, in CHILDREN'S THINKING: WHAT DEVELOPS? 73 (R. Siegler ed. 1978). 
69. See Loftus & Davies, supra note 67, at 54. ''{I]n general, children have greater 
difficulty than adults in retrieving information from long·term memory." For further 
confirmation that memory·fade appears to be age'related, see ORNSTEIN, supra note 59. 
70. Chance & Goldstein, supra note 50, at 79-80. 
71. See, e.g., Dempster, Conditions Affecting Retention Test Performance: A Develop· 
mental Study, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 65, 68 (1984) (24 hours); Cohen & 
Harnick, The Susceptibility of Child Witnesses to Suggestion, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 201, 
204 (1980) (5 days); Bach & Underwood, Developmental Changes in Memory Attributes, 61 
J. EDUC. PSYCHOLOGY 202, 293 (1979) (48 hours); Children as Eyewitnesses, supra note 50, 
at 298 (30 minutes and 2 weeks); Hasher & Thomas, A Deve/opmental Study of Retention, 
9 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 281, 281 (1973) (1 week). 
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that significant delay before recall creates a serious risk of 
unreliability in the trial testimony of children.72 
Furthermore, a strand of memory weakened over time is more 
susceptible to twisting or fragmentary substitution of key links 
resulting from either the child's own imaginative reconstruction 
or the influence of others. The delay-ridden legal system should 
be greatly concerned by data indicating that children are more 
prone to memory self-distortion or to memory manipulation by 
influential persons than are adults. 
Fantasizing by child witnesses has been suspected for 
centuries.73 Until recently, few empirical studies examined a 
child's inability to distinguish real from imagined events. Social 
scientists now believe that children do not have a generalized 
inability to make this distinction. The most intriguing finding is 
that confusion between remembered actual events and imagined 
events varies according to the type of action recalled. For example, 
children displayed significant difficulty, which decreased with 
age, in distinguishing between their own thoughts or plans 
(imagined speech and action) and what they actually said or did.74 
Consequently, the reported research serves at least to caution 
us that a child's account of what he said or did at a particular 
moment in the past needs to be well probed for imagined action. 
Nonetheless, after ten years of research on fantasy, 
experimental psychologists concede that perhaps the inquiry most 
critical to the legal system has yet to be conducted: 
An important question, both for theory and for courtroom 
testimony, is whether children only have difficulty with mem-
72. Although some additional memory loss occurs as time passes, a simple linear 
extrapolation may not be appropriate. It is possible, though as yet unproved, that after 
an initial sharp decline, children's memory stabili2es rather quickly after an initial sharp 
loss just as was once thought true of adult memory. See Hutchins & Schlesinger, SfYTlU! 
Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, 42 HARV. L. REV. 860, 866 (1928). But there 
is a lack of research on the impact of lengthy delays upon the memory capacity of 
children. 
73. As Sir James Fitzjames Stephen commented in 1863: 
[Fantasy is] a considerable evil, for infancy the strength of the imagination 
is out of all proportion to the powers of the other faculties; and children 
constantly say what is not true, not from deceitfulness, but simply because 
they have come to think so, by talking or dreaming what has passed. 
J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 287 (1863). 
74. See Johnson & Foley, supra note 47 at 37 -38. A striking finding of these studies 
is that a child apparently encounters no difficulty in distinguishing between what he 
actually saw or heard another do or say from the other's actions or speech that the child 
was asked to imagine. See id. at 44. 
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ories that involve themselves as agents or whether the same 
pattern would be found with another agent. Would children 
have the same difficulty separating what they saw someone 
else do from what they only imagined that person doing? We 
are currently investigating this question.75 
581 
Even greater concern is raised by the empirical data on 
children's suggestibility. In five recently reported experiments, 
children observed a film or a live enactment of a scene and then 
were questioned.76 Suggestive questions based on incorrect facts 
were interjected to see if the child's personal recall remained 
unshakable. Only one of these studies concluded that children 
were not significantly more prone to suggestibility than young 
adults.77 The other studies found a correlation between 
suggestibility and age.78 It should be underscored that none of 
these memory accuracy or suggestibility experiments tested 
children after a retention period greater than two weeks.79 
III. REFORM OF THE CHILD WITNESS QUALIFICATION PROCESS 
A. Refurbishing the Administration of the Oath 
Experimentation with the rituals used to deter false accusations 
has almost come full circle. The Anglo-American tradition began 
with no oath and we counted on earthly punishment to deter 
perjury - trial by ordeal and trial by combat. Only later was 
perjury made a crime and a witness was required to demonstrate 
an appreciation for divine retribution before giving testimony.so 
Now the trend is toward reducing the oath to sheer liturgy.S! 
75. !d. at 45. 
76. See Loftus & Davies. supra note 67. at 59-62. 
77. Children as Eyewitnesses. supra note 50. at 304. 
78. Loftus & Davies. supra note 67. at 59-62. 
79. ld. at 63. 
80. See Rowley, supra note 12. at 487-88. 
81. The ABA Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence suggested 
modifications in procedure that arguably would enhance only the ritual function of the 
oath. The Committee concluded that to 
ensure the maximum efficacy of the oath: (1) It should be administered by 
the jUdge. not the clerk (2) It should be repeated word for word by the 
witness (3) It should be administered anew to each witness on coming to the 
stand. not to a group and in advance and (4) The judge and all persons in 
the courtroom should stand while the oath is pronounced. 
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. supra note 8, § 603[1], at 6-7 (summarizing 63 REP. OF 
THE AM. B. A. 586 (1938)). 
However. the Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 603 did not adopt even these 
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Predictably, the next change will be the elimination of the oath 
altogether from trial procedures. 
An oath serves three functions: an evidentiary function to 
provide a foundation for later prosecution for perjury; a cautionary 
function to remind the witness of the enforceable demand for 
truth; and a ritual function to establish solemnity for the witness' 
forthcoming role in the trial's search for truth and to underscore 
the cautionary function.82 If the witness approaches the stand 
unaware of his enforceable duty to give truthful testimony, both 
the cautionary and ritual functions of the oath are arguably 
inoperative. 
Insofar as adult witnesses are concerned, the law may well 
indulge in its favorite fiction that every person is presumed to 
know the law, including the prohibition against perjury. That 
same presumption ought not apply with equal vigor when a child 
witness is before the court. The duty of a child witness to report 
accurately requires some minimal instruction from the court 
concerning the potential penalties for false testimony. 
Empirical studies support the conclusion that moral development 
progresses with increasing age from the most primitive stage of 
reward-gain and punishment-avoidance to the adult conscience.83 
Even preschoolers quickly learn to modify their behavior when 
they can associate, through appropriate warnings, a proscribed 
action with certain costs. Although other types of appeals, such 
as the approval of important adults or calls for justice or fairness 
may induce truthfulness in older children, the earliest acquired 
modest suggestions. In fact, the Note provides no clue about either the content of the 
oath or the procedures to be followed in the administration of the oath. Furthermore. 
it is unlikely that many courts will follow suggestions (1) and (4). (2) may 
add something and might well be followed. though it is not in many courts. 
The main point to be observed in most courts is that the clerk who admin· 
isters the oath take it seriously. He should stand upright. face the witness 
and repeat the oath from memory slowly and deliberately. While the oath 
is taken the judge should put aside all his other work. face the witness and 
observe his demeanor in a way that makes it clear the court expects him to 
tell the truth. 
ld. at 7. That only such minimal advice is thought viable underscores the virtual emptiness 
of today's oath requirement. 
82. This classification scheme is borrowed from Gulliver & Tilson. Classification of 
Gratuitous Transfers. 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941) (applying classification scheme to probate 
law). For a historical overview of the purpose of an oath. see In re R.R .• 79 N.J. 97. 107-
11.398 A.2d 76. 81-82 (1979). 
83. See, e.g .• T. LICKONA. supra note 28. at 12. The six stages of moral development 
proposed by Lickona are summarized by Perry & Teply. supra note 22. at 1387. 
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internalization-avoidance of punishment-is not extinguished by 
later moral development.84 
For example, we still make appropriate use of "deterrent 
effect" when we sanction the violation of general rules of adult 
human conduct. Consequently, notice of penalties for false 
testimony is a valid means of capturing the moral sensibilities of 
all children who are to serve as witnesses. 
Although criminal perjury penalties apply if cross-examination 
or other evidence proves testimony false, the usual oath does 
not include even a reminder that truth is an enforceable societal 
demand.8s Perjury is a crime in every American jurisdiction and 
is now included within every state's definition of a delinquent 
act.86 It does not matter that child witnesses may be below the 
age of criminal accountability. If we are seriously concerned about 
truthful accounts, aside from issues of the accuracy of the original 
perceptions, we ought to be prepared to file delinquency charges 
against any properly warned child who knowingly gives false 
testimony. 
The cautionary aspect of the oath is essential to reinforce the 
oath's significance for child witnesses. Due process may require 
notice of potential punishments for perjury before a child testifies. 
Although there is no similar duty to warn an adult before he 
commits a crime, surely there is a heightened duty to insure that 
a child is fairly apprised of the consequences of falsity when she 
is placed in jeopardy.87 Notice of criminality might also be required 
as part of a threshold showing of the willfulness element in any 
subsequent perjury prosecution. 
84. ld. at 17. 
85. See State v. Zamorsky, 170 N.J. Super. 198, 406 A.2d 192 (1979). The appellate 
court affirmed the admissibility of testimony of a six-year-old victim, despite the fact 
that she had not been administered a formal oath. The voir dire clearly elicited information 
that the child realized that "little girls that don't tell the truth" get "punished" and thus 
served the purpose of the administration of the oath. ld. at 202, 406 A.2d at 194. 
86. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. S 51.03(c) (Vernon 1986) ("Nothing in this title 
prevents criminal proceedings against a child for perjury."); UNIF. JUVENILE COURT ACT, 
S 2(2) (1987) (defining a "delinquent act" as "an act designated a crime under the law, 
including local [ordinances or resolutions] of this state, or of another state if the act 
occurred in that state, or under federal law"). Cj. Note, The Competency of Children as 
Witnesses, 39 VA. L. REV. 358, 368-69 (1953) (reviewing early precedent holding that 
children could not be punished for the offense of perjury). 
87. The due process rights of a child defendant to notice and the privilege against 
self-incrimination were recognized in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)' See generally S. DAVIS, 
RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, 5-1-5-49 (rev. ed. 1986). 
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Perhaps the two most important adjustments in current practice 
should be that the oath administration format be one of instruction 
rather than interrogation and the responsibility for securing oath 
awareness should shift from counsel to the court. The court 
should inform any child witness, in words the child can 
comprehend, that she is expected to answer truthfully all questions 
asked. The court should instruct the child explicitly that if she 
does not know the answer to any question, the court will expect 
her to say that she does not know the answer rather than guess 
about what might have happened. A substantial body of research 
on child interviewing shows that children often misperceive a 
duty to supply an answer to every question.BB While knowledgeable 
counsel already may have given this instruction to a child witness,89 
it is important to have it authoritatively underscored by the 
court. The court should also reassure the child that she should 
not worry about how others receive what she has to say or 
attempt to please the lawyers, the judge, or anyone else in giving 
her testimony. Instead, she should give only those facts which 
88. Although empirical siata demonstrates this tendency in children, researchers 
disagree why it occurs. Some attribute this tendency to the "demand characteristic" of 
all direct questioning. For example, asking a child whether a person had blonde, brunette, 
or black hair indirectly suggests that hair color is important and something she should 
be able to provide. An adult may resist this implicit demand; a younger child may 
misinterpret the interviewer's intentions and end up providing what he or she feels is 
an appropriate answer." Dent & Stephenson, An Experimental Study of the E..tJectit'eness 
of Different Techniques of Questioning Child Witnesses, 18 BRIT. J. OF Soc. AND CLINICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 41-51, summarized in King & Yuille, Suggestibility and the Child Witness, 
in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 24, 27 (S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. ROBB ed. 1987). 
Other researchers have attributed this tendency to the child's developing ability to 
make inferences. Children struggle to bring order out of confusion, to make sense of 
questions, and to provide answers to adults' questions. Researchers interviewed five· and 
seven-year-olds using nonsensical questions, such as "Is milk bigger than water?" or "Is 
red heavier than yellow?" An adult predictably would at best be puzzled, or at worst, 
refuse to answer the question while perhaps exhibiting some anger at such a waste of 
his time. In contrast, "virtually all the children responded in a serious, reasoned manner, 
stating for example, 'Milk is bigger because it has more color' or 'Yellow is heavier 
because the red cushion is smaller than the yellow cushion there.' " Hughes & Grieve, 
On Asking Children Bizarre Questions, in EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION 
(M. Donaldson, R. Grieve & C. Pratt ed. 1980). 
89. Counsel is advised to prepare a child for croBB-examination by cautioning him not 
to guess: 
The child should be told that it is acceptable to say, "I don't know." Unlike 
at school, where "I don't know" gets the child in trouble, in the courtroom 
the child is not required to know the answer to every question. The child 
may be told that if a question is confusing or incomprehensible, the child 
can ask the cross-examiner to repeat the question. 
J. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND PRACTICE 46 (1987). 
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she personally remembers.90 The child is not responsible for the 
outcome of the trial; she is responsible only for telling accurately 
what she knows about the dispute. Finally, the court should 
instruct the child that if she gives false testimony, she could 
become subject to juvenile court prosecution for perjury and 
would face appropriate penalties.91 
The prospect of relating such sophisticated concepts to a child 
in language appropriate to his understanding is daunting to those 
who have not had occasion to do so. Most juvenile court judges, 
however, are highly skilled in interacting with children in court 
and their expertise should be sought to devise pattern instructions 
adaptable to the needs of particular cases. We already require 
juvenile courts to "Boykinize"92 a delinquent child who seeks to 
90. Recent data indicates that younger children are significantly more likely than 
older children to embellish their recall of an event with unobserved but likely detail. In 
interpreting such findings. one researcher provides this advice: 
[l]f third·graders add more extraneous information to their recall because 
they assume that "more" means "better." and try to please an adult by 
increasing the size of their production. then they should be cautioned against 
this tendency with prequestioning instructions. The child could be warned 
that the investigator does not want more information but rather accurate 
information. It may be that. given such instructions. young children can 
reduce their additions. in contrast to children who did not receive these 
instructions. 
Saywitz. Children's Testimony: Age·Related Patterns of Memory Errors. in CmLDREN'S 
EYEWITNESSES MEMORY 47 (S. Ceci. M. Toglia & D. Ross ed. 1987). 
91. See. e.g .• Payne v. State. 487 So. 2d 256. 263 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). A mentally 
impaired fifteen-year-old was permitted to testify after the trial court had conducted a 
voir dire and had instructed the child on the law of perjury: 
I want you to listen carefully. There is such a thing in law called perjury. 
And perjury is the giving of testimony that is false. once one has taken an 
oath in Court to tell the truth. nothing but the truth. the whole truth. If 
one. having sworn and taken an oath. that they will tell the truth before a 
Court. then intentionally misrepresents the facts by telling a lie. to any 
question asked in the Court. he can be found guilty of the crime of perjury. 
and for that offense as an adult could be imprisoned. or as a juvenile could 
also be detained. the equivalence of being imprisoned. So. I instruct you that 
is the penalty for the offense of perjury. You are expected to tell the truth 
at all times to all questions that are asked you. I have concluded. though. 
he is competent to testify as a witness before the Court. 
!d. at 263. The problem with this attempted instruction is that it is probably only vaguely 
understood by this defendant or any other child. Further translation into simpler language 
is needed. 
92. In Boykin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). the Court held that the trial court 
must conduct an examination into voluntariness. including "an attempt to satisfy itself 
that the defendant understands the nature of the charges. his right to a jury trial. the 
acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible 
range of sentences" in order to insure that a guilty plea was voluntarily entered. !d. at 
244 n.7 (quoting Commonwealth ex ret. West v. Rundle. 428 Pa. 102. 105-06. 237 A.2d 
196. 197 -98 (19881. 
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enter a guilty plea, including instructions about the maximum 
and minimum penalties which can be imposed.93 Basic instruction 
about the duties imposed by the oath is a much less complicated 
task than apprising a child of the waiver of rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution. 
B. Refocusing the Voir Dire 
Modern empirical data on reliability risks do not indicate that 
the ancient disqualification of children as a class is justified. The 
data do permit us, however, to refine our assessment of the 
reliability risks peculiar to children. 
Data on memory-fade and children's heightened susceptibility 
to imagining and suggestion point to the need for pretrial 
processes that would insure recording children's accounts soon 
after observed events. Many states already have enacted special 
videotaping statutes which make such early recordings admissible 
into evidence.94 Most of these states, however, confine videotaping 
procedures to criminal prosecutions,95 or narrower still, to sexual 
abuse prosecutions.96 Furthermore, many states,97 including 
93. See, e.g., In re Jarrell, 395 So. 2d 1382 (La. Ct. App.), 1'ev'd, 399 So. 2d 583 (La. 
Supp. 1981). 
94. ALA. CODE S 15-25-2 (Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT. S 12.45.047 (1984): ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. S 134251 to -4253 (Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 16-44·203 (1987): CAL. 
PENAL CODE S 1346 (West 1982); CoLO. REV. STAT. S 18·3-413 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 
92.53 to .55 (West Supp. 1989): HAW. REV. STAT. S 626 Rule 616 (1985): KAN. CRIM. PROC. 
CODE ANN. S 22-3434 (Vernon Supp. 1989): Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. S 421.350 (MichieiBobbs· 
Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 15.440.1 to .6 (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. 
S 595.02(3), (4) (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. S 45-15-401 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. S 174.227 
(Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 517:13-a (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 30-9-17 
(1984): N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW S 190.32 (McKinney 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, S 753 
(West Supp. 1989): R.I. GEN. LAWS S 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 
23A-12-9 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. S 24-7-116 (Supp. 1987); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. S 
38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1989); VT. R. EVID. 807 (Supp. 1988): WIS. STAT. ANN. S 967.04(7)(a) 
(West Supp. 1988). 
95. See, e.g., California, New York, and Texas statutes cited in supra note 94. The 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws struck a strange middle course by permitting 
videotapes as an exception to the hearsay rule in cases in which a child witness was to 
give testimony about "sexual conduct or physical violence performed by or with another 
on or with that minor or any [other person]." UNIF. R. EVID. 807(a)(j) (adopted Nov. 1986). 
96. See Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, and Vermont statutes cited supra note 94. 
97. ALASKA STAT. S 12.40.110 (Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-1416 (Supp. 
1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 16-41-101(25)(a) (1987); CAL. EvID. CODE S 1228 (West Supp. 1989); 
COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-3-411(3) (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 90.803 (West Supp. 1989); ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 115-10 (Smith-Hurd 1986); IND. CODE ANN. S 35-39-4-6 (Burns 1985); 
KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE S 60-460(dd) (Vernon Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. S 421.355 
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Georgia, have recently expanded the hearsay exceptions to permit 
the admission of children's statements of abuse provided the 
court finds that "the circumstances of the statement provide 
sufficient indicia of reliability."98 If, as the data suggest, a child's 
memory is most reliable when it is fresh, these special procedures 
for capturing and preserving the child's early account should be 
expanded to all types of legal proceedings.99 
In litigation lacking a videotaped record of a child's early 
statement, the voir dire is the next best mechanism available for 
determining if distortions exist, albeit after the fact. Despite 
convincing empirical data, the federal approach totally discounts 
the possibility of any inherent reliability risks in the testimony 
of child witnesses. The "oath understanding" voir dire similarly 
permits an abstract avowal of the truth to override such inherent 
reliability risks, that is, distortions over which even the most 
God-fearing child may have no control. The "full inquiry" voir 
dire is not reliability risk specific; it allows a court to ask the 
right questions, but it also permits many wrong ones which have 
little or no bearing upon testimonial accuracy. 
The limited voir dire of a child witness is appropriate but its 
focus should be on the presence of the interrelated reliability 
risks of memory-fade and its bedfellows fantasization and 
suggestibility. A brief inquiry focused on the opportunities for 
distortion that may have occurred between the observation and 
the trial can resolve these concerns. The burden of laying a 
foundation of reliability should be on the party offering the child's 
testimony into evidence. An appropriate statute or court rule 
might read: 
Admissibility of Children's Testimony. No child shall be per-
mitted to testify unless the court finds after preliminary 
!MichieiBobbs·Merrill Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, S 1205 (Supp. 1988); MINN. 
STAT. S 595.02(3) (1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. S 491.075 (Vernon Supp. 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. S 51.385 (Michie 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16·38 (1987); TEX. CRIlII. PROC. 
CODE ANN. S 38.072 (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76·5-411 (Supp. 1988); VT. R. 
EVID. 804(a) (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988). 
98. O.C.G.A. S 24·3-16 (Supp. 1988). Georgia's statute derives from the Washington 
statute which has served as a prototype for many other jurisdictions. WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. S 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1984). 
99. Reform of the pretrial processes is another subject to be explored. It is sufficient 
to suggest here that enhancing the reliability of children's testimony requires changes in 
both the pretrial processes and the voir dire procedure. See McGough & Hornsby, supra 
note 60, at 1300-03 for some suggested reforms. 
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examination, that the child is able to give reliable testimony 
based on the following criteria: 
(1) The age of the child at trial and age at the time of the 
observed event or transaction; 
(2) The length of time between the observation and the 
child's first report to an adult; 
(3) The circumstances and results of all interviews, including 
recorded interviews which are not being offered as evidence, 
which have been conducted with the child about his obser-
vations by anyone, including those conducted by members of 
the child's family; 
(4) Any variations in the child's account which have oc-
curred in the interval between the first report and the trial; 
(5) Evidence concerning the motive, inclination, and oppor-
tunity for any interviewer to influence the child's current 
proposed trial testimony; 
(6) The existence of other apparent motives of the child to 
falsify; and 
(7) The existence of corroborating evidence that the child 
had the opportunity to observe the event in question. tOO 
If substantial time has elapsed since the observed event, the 
trial court should properly be concerned about a child's recall 
ability. If coaching is suspected, the court also should question 
any adults suspected of influencing the child.lol As one 
commentator has cautioned: 
[H]uman memory does not operate like a camera, gathering 
every detail for later recall exactly as it was perceived. 
Rather, it is an active, reconstructive process in which images 
are constantly altered through the integration of new expe-
riences and interpretations. A person can unknowingly inte-
grate post-event information to fill gaps or replace forgotten 
or poorly remembered details, with imagination frequently 
playing a significant role. The result can be distorted or 
totally incorrect recall. t02 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Debates on competency and the voir dire have focused on the 
wrong issues. The struggle of the last two centuries has concerned 
100. The catalyst for this proposal is contained in the official comments to UNIF. R. 
EVID. 807, 13A U.L.A. 237 (Supp. 1989). 
101. See Davis v. State, 348 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 
102. Comment, Um'eliahle Eyewitness Evidence: The Expert Psychologi$t and tk Defense 
in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. REV. 721,724 (1985). 
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whether special prevenient proofs for child witnesses ought to 
be abandoned altogether or, instead, retained for some limited 
purpose, though that purpose has never been well-defined. The 
classic approach of legal commentary has been to analyze the 
substantive components of truthful testimony using Wigmore's 
categories: capacity for observation, recollection, communication, 
and moral responsibility. 
This Article proposes an oath ceremony that would establish 
a meaningful dialogue between the trial court and the child. The 
role of the court should shift from being merely an arbiter of 
the adequacy of counsel's interrogation of the child to being the 
child's advisor who explains the nature of the duty imposed by 
the oath. The proposed voir dire makes a fundamental and 
appropriate shift in focus from determining a child's general 
capacity at the time of trial to the pretrial processes used to 
receive or record his account and the opportunities, if any, for 
distorting his memory. The focus should be on the narrow issue 
of reliability risk assessment rather than on some abstract notion 
of age-related competence. The potential distortions of memory-
fade, fantasization, and suggestibility deserve to be treated as 
substantial matters for serious pretestimony inquiry. 
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